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I. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD GRANT PETITIONERS' WRIT OP CERTIORARI. 
Two of the considerations listed in Utah R. App. P. 46 apply, 
contrary to the Division's assertion, to the present case: 
Subsection (c) is applicable because the Court of Appeals, through 
its Order, has brought into question its recognition of the 
exception to the general rule requiring exhaustion of judicial 
remedies set forth in Utah Code Ann, § 63-46b-14(2) (1991). This 
creates a substantial departure from the previous Utah decision in 
Tax Comm'n v. Iverson, 782 P.2d 519, 524 (Utah 1989), in which the 
Utah Supreme Court recognized that an exception for the general 
rule requiring exhaustion exists where "there is a likelihood that 
some oppression or injustice is occurring such that it would be 
unconscionable not to review the alleged grievance." 
Subsection (d) of Rule 46 applies to the present case because 
the Court of Appeals has apparently decided that there is no 
situation in which interlocutory review of an administrative order 
is possible, despite the clear language of § 63-46b-14(2). This is 
an important question of state law which has not been directly 
settled by the Supreme Court, but should be. 
II. THE DIVISION HAS FAILED TO SHOW THAT THE COURT OP APPEALS 
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING PETITIONERS' PETITION FOR 
INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL. 
While petitioners do not dispute the fact that the Court of 
Appeals summarily dismissed petitioners' Petition without stating 
its reasons for doing so, it is not clear from the face of the 
Order that the Court made no determination as to jurisdiction. The 
predominant arguments raised below by both parties revolved around 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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the issue of the Court of Appeals's jurisdiction, so it is at least 
arguable that the Court considered jurisdiction in its Order. 
(Please see the Appendix to this brief and Division's Appendix C.) 
The Court of Appeals considered Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) 
(1991) as grounds for appellate jurisdiction because the Division 
raised this section as grounds for denying jurisdiction in its 
arguments below. "A matter is sufficiently raised if it is 
submitted to the [lower] court, and the court is afforded an 
opportunity to rule on the issue." Hardy v. Hardy, 776 P.2d 917, 
919 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Petitioners' Petition substantially complies with the 
requirements for a petition for extraordinary writ in Utah R. App. 
P. 19, and neither Rule 19 nor Utah R. Civ. P. 65B require that a 
motion be filed as asserted by the Division. Rule 65B states that 
"[t]here shall be no special form of writ," and Rule 19 designates 
the required filing as a "petition for extraordinary writ." 
III. THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS HAS JURISDICTION TO REVIEW NON-FINAL 
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS IN THE EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES 
OUTLINED IN § 63-46B-14(2). 
Due process of law in the context of administrative actions, 
despite the Divisions assertions to the contrary, includes 
judicial review when such is provided for by statute. See DeBry v. 
Salt Lake County Board of Appeals, 764 P. 2d 627, 627 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988) . Petitioners' argument is based upon statutes, including § 
63-46b-14 (2) , which relieve a party seeking judicial review from 
the requirement of exhausting any and all administrative remedies 
if the administrative remedies are inadequate or "exhaustion of 
remedies would result in irreparable harm disproportionate to the 
public benefit derived from requiring exhaustion." Summary denial 
2 
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of judicial review under the present circumstances could, 
accordingly, be a denial of petitioners7 due process rights. 
The Division's cited cases do not support its contention that 
the Court of Appeals lacks jurisdiction in the present case. DeBry 
deals with an appeal from a final order of a local governmental 
agency for which there was no statutory provision creating a right 
to judicial review. Barney v. Division of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing, 828 P.2d 542 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Heaton 
v. Second Injury Fund, 796 P.2d 676 (Utah 1990); and Baird v. 
State, 574 P.2d 713 (Utah 1978) are not applicable to the present 
case because none of the petitioners in these cases, unlike the 
present petitioners, raised any allegation of irreparable harm or 
insufficient admininstrative remedies, thereby invoking § 63-46b-
14(2). None of these cases have, accordingly, ruled on the narrow 
issue currently before this Court, so are not controlling. 
Generally accepted rules of statutory construction, including 
those requiring courts to give the words used in statutes their 
plain, ordinary meaning, State in re R.D.S. , 777 P.2d 532, 537 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989) , and requiring related statutes to be read 
together and construed harmoniously, State v. Chindcrren, 777 P.2d 
527, 529 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), require that the appellate courts 
recognize the exception to the rule of finality spelled out in § 
63-46b-14 (2) . Adherence to this rule does not, as the Division 
suggests, violate this Court's compliance with the UAPA. 
IV. SECTION 63-46B-14<2) DISPELS THE REQUIREMENT OP FINALITY OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS IN CASES COMING WITHIN ITS PURVIEW. 
The Divisions position that a party cannot obtain judicial 
review without obtaining a final administrative order unless he 
3 
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completely bypasses the administrative forum is not supported by 
case law, and is inconsistent with § 63-46b-14 (2) , so should be 
disregarded. First, S & G. Inc. v. Morgan, 797 P. 2d 1085 (Utah 
1990), cited to by the Division, does not state that the only way 
to avoid the requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies 
is to bypass the administrative forum, but held the opposite, 
finding that a party which did not participate in the 
administrative hearing did not have standing to appeal the agency's 
decision. Second, generally accepted canons of statutory 
interpretation require that a statute, including § 63-46b-14(2), be 
interpreted according to its common, plain meaning if possible. 
The language stating that "the court may relieve a party seeking 
judicial review of the requirement to exhaust any or all 
administrative remedies" not only refers to bypassing the agency 
altogether, but also to not proceeding to a final order even if the 
party is appearing before the agency. The Divison's arguments that 
interlocutory orders that deal with procedural or evidentiary 
issues or which do not affect the rights of the parties are not 
contemplated in § 63-46b-14(2) conflict with the statute; the 
statutory language is not so restrictive, but includes "any and all 
administrative remedies." It is, further, obvious that procedural 
and evidentiary orders affect the rights of the parties. 
V. PETITIONERS HAVE RAISED VALID CLAIMS OF IRREPARABLE HARM AND 
INADEQUATE ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES. 
The potential harm petitioners will suffer should review of 
the Division's orders not be allowed has been outlined in the 
previous Petition. Notably, although this case has received some 
press coverage, this is insubstantial compared to the coverage 
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which will occur should petitioners be required to go through an 
evidentiary hearing which is open to the press and public. The 
ensuing harm which petitioners will sustain to their personal and 
business reputations will be even more substantial. Although 
petitioners may have made a few statements to the press, they have 
generally been in the nature of damage control, and made in 
response to public announcements and allegations made by the 
Division and several of its witnesses. The Division's continual 
recitation of the argument that publicity will not affect the 
dental board only serves to beg the argument that petitioners have 
raised concerning potential damage to their reputations. This 
court can substantially minimize bad publicity by granting 
petitioners7 Petition and reversing the Division's order 
authorizing a public hearing. 
VI. THE POTENTIAL HARM TO PETITIONERS FAR EXCEEDS THE PUBLIC 
INTEREST IN PROCEEDING TO HEARING PRIOR TO RESOLUTION OF THE 
PRESENT ISSUES. 
Petitioners do not dispute the well settled principles that 
the government's interest in protecting the public health or safety 
is paramount, or that the right of physicians or dentists to 
practice their professions is necessarily subordinate to that 
interest, so the Division's arguments to this effect beg the issue. 
The real issue, which should have been addressed but was not by the 
Division, is the balancing of the potential irreparable harm to 
petitioners against the interest of the public in pursuing a final 
order before seeking judicial review, which balancing is required 
by § 63-46b-14(2). 
In summary, the Division has raised no argument which can 
succeed in defeating Petitioner's arguments. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
KENT BLAINE HANSEN AND BRENT ] 
D. HANSEN, ] 
Petitioners, ] 
vs. 
DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL ] 
AND PROFESSIONAL LICENSING, ] 
Respondent. 
| MOTION IN OPPOSITION | TO PETITIONERS' PETITION FOR | REVIEW OR, IN THE | ALTERNATIVE, FOR | EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF 
) Agency Case No. OPL-89-47 
Respondent, the Division of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing ("Division"), by and through counsel, 
Robert E. Steed, Assistant Attorney General, submits the 
following memorandum in opposition to Petitioners' Petition For 
Review Or, In The Alternative, For Extraordinary Relief. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1• Petitioners are licensees of the Division of Occupational 
& Professional Licensing ("Division"), Petitioners are licensed 
to practice Dentistry and to prescribe and administer controlled 
substances. 
2. Petitioners are brothers who practice Dentistry together 
in two offices located in Spanish Fork and Midvale, Utah, 
3. In August 1989, a petition was filed by the Division 
alleging that Petitioners engaged in unprofessional conduct 
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including incompetence in the practice of dentistry, fraudulent 
billing practices, over-prescribing controlled substances, 
engaging in sexual acts with a patient in exchange for drugs and 
taking lewd nude photographs of a patient while she was under the 
influence of nitrous oxide, 
4. On June 14, 1991, counsel for the Division filed a 
Motion in Limine to Exclude Irrelevant Evidence. Petitioners 
filed their response on June 26, 1992. Oral argument was heard on 
the Division motion in limine on April 1, 1992. 
5. On April 17, 1992, Administrative Law Judge, Stephen 
Eklund, issued an order permitting Petitioner's to present 
evidence of K.W.'s or any other witness' prior sexual behavior 
"with a licensed health care professional within the context of a 
physician/patient relationship, both on cross-examination of that 
witness and for possible impeachment purposes of rebuttal." 
(Order on Division's Motion in Limine, April 17, 1992 p.9) Only 
evidence of K.W.'s or another witness' "general prior sexual 
history or reputation shall be excluded." Id. 
6. On June 21, 1991, Petitioners filed a motion to close 
the hearing to the public and a memorandum regarding the 
appropriate standard of proof for disciplinary hearings. The 
Division filed a response to Petitioner's motion on July 1, 1991. 
With respect to the motion to close the hearing, the Salt Lake 
Tribune filed a petition to intervene on July 1, 1991. 
Administrative Law Judge Stephen Eklund granted the Tribune's 
petition on July 2, 1991. 
2 
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7. On April 1, 1992 oral argument on Petitioners' motion to 
close was heard before the administrative law judge and the 
Dentist and Dental Hygienist Licensing Board. Pursuant to 
section 52-4-1 et seq. the Board voted four to two to keep the 
hearing open- On April 7, 199 2 the administrative law judge 
issued an order on behalf of the Board providing that the hearing 
would remain open to the public. 
8. On April 1,- 1992, oral argument on the standard of proof 
was heard by the administrative law judge. The administrative 
law judge issued an order on April 17, 1992 stating that 
preponderance of the evidence was the standard of proof in 
administrative proceedings 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS LACKS JURISDICTION TO 
REVIEW THE ORDERS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE AT 
THIS JUNCTURE 
Petitioners' request for interlocutory review of the orders 
of the administrative law judge is not properly before this 
court. Petitioners' request is based on Rule 14 and Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-46b-14(2)(b)(1991) or in the alternative, Rule 19 of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and Rule 65B of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Despite Petitioners' alternative 
theories of jurisdiction, Petitioners have overlooked section 78-
2a-3(2)(a) and section 63-46b-16(l) which vest this court with 
jurisdiction to review "final orders" from administrative 
agencies. Utah Code Ann. §§ (1953 as amended). 
3 
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Section 78-2a-3(2)(a) vests the Court of Appeals with 
"appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory 
appeals, over the final orders and decrees resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the 
district court review of informal adjudicative proceeding," Utah 
Code Ann- § (1992). Moreover, section 63-46b-16(l) of the 
Administrative Procedures Act restates that the Court of Appeals 
"has jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting 
from formal adjudicative proceedings. Utah Code Ann. § (1989). 
The orders of the administrative law judge, that Petitioners 
seek to have reviewed by this court are not final orders nor do 
the interlocutory orders of the administrative law judge 
constitute final agency action. A final order will be issued by 
the Division only after formal adjudicative proceedings in this 
matter have been concluded and all issues pending before the 
Division have been determined. 
In Sloan v. Board of Review of Industrial Commission, the 
Utah Court of Appeals dismissed an appeal taken from an order of 
the Industrial Commission for lack of jurisdiction. The 
Industrial Commission adopted the findings of the administrative 
law judge but remanded the issue of whether claimant was entitled 
to medical expenses. 781 P.2d 463 (Utah App. 1989). The Sloan 
court held that the remand order was not a final appealable 
order. "We agree that an order of the agency is not final so 
long as it reserves something to the agency for further 
decision." Id. at 464. 
4 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Attempts to seek interlocutory review of non-final orders of 
the agency is not new to the Division. For example, in Barney v. 
Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing, the Utah 
Court of Appeals recently dismissed an appeal filed by a licensed 
health facility administrator whose license is the target of 
disciplinary proceedings initiated by the Division. Case No. 
910755-CA (Utah Ct. App. March, 26, 1992)1 The respondent, 
Barney, accused of physically assaulting patients and 
administering contaminated pills to patients, filed an appeal 
from the order of the administrative law judge, Stephen Eklund, 
denying his motion to dismiss the Division's petition. Referring 
to Sloan, the court held it did not have jurisdiction to review 
the order of the administrative law judge because that order 
lacked "finality"• 
[T]he requirement of finality contemplates that the 
agency proceedings have been brought to their 
conclusion by disposition of all issues before the 
agency. The denial of a motion to dismiss allows the 
proceeding to continue in the agency and is not a final 
order for purposes of judicial review. 
Id. at 3. (emphasis added)2 
The Division acknowledges that this opinion, although 
scheduled to be published, has yet to be published and may be 
revised or withdrawn prior to publication. 
2
. In an unpublished opinion, the Utah Court of Appeals in 
Eliason v. Buhler et al. dismissed an appeal in which a physician, 
charged with sexually abusing male patients, brought an appeal 
citing to Rule 65B(b)(2) and (4), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
and Extraordinary Writs under Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. The Eliason court dismissed the appeal 
because no final order had been issued pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
S#13-1-12(1)(a) (1990). While this opinion does not establish a 
binding precedent, it is consistent with appeals court's ruling in 
Sloan and Barney. 
5 
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2. SECTION 63-46b-14(2)(b) DOES NOT CREATE AN EXCEPTION TO 
THE REQUIREMENT OF FINAL AGENCY ACTION 
Petitioners misinterpret section 63-46b-14(2)(b) as allowing 
this court to review non-final agency orders. Although section 
63-46b-14(2)(b) does provide an exception to the requirement that 
a party exhaust all administrative remedies before seeking 
judicial review, it does not excuse the requirement that there be 
final agency action or a final order. Once a case is proceeding 
in the administrative forum, review of the agencies orders can 
only be had after a final order is issued. Utah Code Ann. § 78-
2a-3(2)(a) (1992), Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(1)(1989). 
To excuse their failure to exhaust administrative remedies 
or await a final order, Petitioners claim that they will suffer 
irreparable harm if the proceedings before the Division are 
allowed to continue on its present course. Petitioners 
specifically refer to the publicity this matter, which is nearly 
three years old, has received in the media and press. Although a 
complete review of the publicity and attention this matter has 
received in the press is not warranted and is irrelevant, it 
suffices to say the Petitioners themselves have made numerous 
statements to the press, including statements to the national and 
local media. However, regardless of the attention the press or 
media has imparted to these proceedings, it is evident that the 
Dental Board, who will serve as the fact finder in this matter, 
have been unaffected by it. During a special voir dire 
proceeding on April 1, 199 2, counsel for Petitioners was allowed 
to question the Board about its knowledge of the case and any 
6 
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conflict that might warrant the recusal of a Board member. 
During voir dire, it became clear that the Dental Board has not 
been affected and has remained unaware of pre-hearing publicity 
concerning this case. In fact, counsel passed for cause all 
members of the Board excluding its public member who served as a 
past director of the Department of Commerce. The public member 
was subsequently recused from participating in these proceedings 
because of his prior role with the Division. 
Despite, Petitioners assertion that these proceedings are 
becoming a "media event", the Dental Board has remained impartial 
and unaffected by any media attention given this matter. 
Moreover, Petitioners can not be "convicted" by the Dental Board 
in any event. The Board's sole responsibility is to determine 
whether Petitioners have violated the rules and laws governing 
their profession and what, if any, sanction should be imposed on 
Petitioners' licenses. Consequently, petitioners' claims, 
unsupported by memoranda or exhibit, concerning the adverse 
impact of publicity in this case is without merit and is 
irrelevant to whether this court has jurisdiction to review the 
interlocutory orders of the administrative law judge. 
3. A FINAL ORDER WILL BE ISSUED ONLY AFTER THE 
COMPLETION OF ADJUDICATIVE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE AND DENTAL BOARD 
Final orders of the Division are rendered only at the 
culmination of adjudicative proceedings before the administrative 
law judge and the professional or occupational board. Section 
13-1-12 provides, "At the close of an adjudicative proceeding, 
7 
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the administrative law judge or an occupational board or 
representative committee with assistance from the administrative 
law judge, shall issue an order." Utah Code Ann. § (Supp. 1991). 
See also, Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-16 (Supp. 1991). 
Because no final order has been issued, judicial review of 
the Administrative Law Judge's orders is premature and 
procedurally inappropriate. There are numerous issues, including 
findings on the merits of the allegations, that still must be 
determined by the agency. Despite Petitioners' assertion that it 
would be more efficient to resolve legal disputes on appeal to 
this court before the hearing, this would be the least efficient 
manner to resolve the legal issues raised by Petitioners. In the 
event Petitioners are absolved of any professional violation, 
review by this court would be moot. Moreover, rather than review 
the orders of the Division in piecemeal fashion, it would be more 
practicable to review the orders of the administrative law judge 
in conjunction with all other grounds for appeal that may be 
filed subsequent to the hearing. 
4. PETITIONERS HAVE NOT COMPLIED WITH RULE 19 FOR 
EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF 
Petitioners' motion seeks review of the interlocutory orders 
of the administrative law judge under Rule 14 or Rule 19 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Admittedly, Petitioners have 
decided to file this motion first as a Rule 14 motion. According 
to Petitioners this excuses the fact that no memoranda or points 
and authorities or other supporting documentation has been filed 
to support their request. While Rule 14 does not expressly 
8 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
require a memorandum on the merits at the time of filing, Rule 
23(a)(3)(4) does. 
Moreover, Petitioners' reliance on Rule 14 as a 
jurisdictional basis to obtain review of an interlocutory order 
from an administrative agency is misplaced. As discussed above, 
the court does not have jurisdiction to review non-final agency 
decisions and Rule 14 does not provide any extraordinary relief 
or alternative remedy that would vest the Court of Appeals with 
jurisdiction to review interlocutory orders. 
Petitioners' request for agency review bears some 
resemblance to the requirements of Rule 5 concerning 
Discretionary appeals from interlocutory orders. Judging from 
the content of Petitioner's memorandum, it contains verbatim the 
content requirements for petitions submitted under Rule 5. 
However, because Rule 5 applies exclusively to the orders of 
"district court, juvenile court, or circuit court", it would have 
no application to the interlocutory orders of administrative 
agencies. This is not excluding the fact that under Rule 5, 
Petitioners' request for review and this response would be 
considered untimely. 
As a practical matter, Petitioners should have filed a 
motion and memorandum on the merits in so far as they intend to 
base their appeal on alternative theories of jurisdiction. 
Because Petitioners are seeking extraordinary relief under Rule 
19, they should be required to do more than submit mere claims 
and assertions, unsupported by affidavits, exhibits or any 
9 
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competent evidence. It simply is not fair or judicially 
economical for the courts to be placed in the position of telling 
petitioners what theory of jurisdiction they will accept and then 
give leave to the parties to comply with the filing requirements 
of the rules. Rather than give the court a choice of alternative 
theories of jurisdiction, Petitioners should have provided this 
court with specific grounds and legal arguments to support their 
jurisdictional arguments. 
Because, Petitioners cite Rule 19 as an alternative theory 
of jurisdiction, they are required to comply with the 
requirements for a motion under Rule 19. Among other things that 
are lacking in Petitioners' motion, Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure requires that Petitioners' motion include "a 
statement explaining why it is impractical or inappropriate to 
file the petition in the district court" and "a memorandum of 
points and authorities in support of the petition. Consequently, 
Petitioners' request for review pursuant to Rule 19 is not 
properly before this court and Respondent retains the right to 
respond to any motion, properly filed before this court, for 
extraordinary relief. This however, is contingent on whether 
Petitioners can now timely file a motion for extraordinary relief 
with this court. In any event, the same arguments addressed 
above relating to the exhaustion of administrative remedies and 
finality of administrative orders apply with equal force to 
Petitioners' request for extraordinary relief. 
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Respondent respectfully requests that the court dispose of 
all jurisdictional issues and deny Petitioners' request for 
judicial review, 
CONCLUSION 
Petitioners request for review of interlocutory orders of 
the administrative law judge is procedurally improper. This 
court lacks jurisdiction to review the orders of the 
administrative law judge until the Division issues a final order 
in this matter- Although the requirement also applies with equal 
strength to Petitioners' request for extraordinary relief, 
Petitioners' request is not properly before this court until the 
requirements of Rule 19 are fulfilled. Consequently, Respondent 
request that Petitioners' request for judicial review be denied 
for lack of jurisdiction. 
Submitted this-~^# day of May, 1992. 
"—ROBERT E. ST6ED 
Assistant Attorney General 
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•~~~) . CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1/ , ' ^ ^ < J 7 i / / c a r t i f v that on S/^U, S?7. / ? ? J . 
I served a copy of the attached MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
PETITIONERS' PETITION FOR REVIEW OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR 
EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF to Jackson Howard, counsel for Petitioners 
in this matter, by mailing it to him by first class mail with 
sufficient postage prepaid to the following address: 
Jackson Howard, Esq. 
Howard, Lewis & Petersen 
120 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84603 
12 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
